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The Political Economy of “Constitutional
Political Economy”
Jeremy K. Kessler*
Introduction
Since the early 1990s, constitutional history has experienced a
renaissance.1 This revival had many causes, but three stand out: the
Rehnquist Court’s attack on formerly sacrosanct features of the “New Deal
agenda”;2 Reagan-Era reassessments of American political development by
political scientists, historians, and historical sociologists;3 and the
frustration of constitutional scholars with the inability of legal process
theory or political philosophy to produce “authoritative constitutional
principles.”4 Spurred by legal crisis and this mix of disciplinary innovation
and stagnation, law professors began to tell new stories about our
constitutional heritage.5 They focused on the sources and significance of
the New Deal’s “constitutional revolution,”6 while also re-examining the
constitutionalism of the Founding and Reconstruction in light of New Deal
transformations.7

* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. See Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST.
REV. 1052, 1059–60 (2005) (recognizing that “New Deal scholarship became hot in the early
1990s”).
2. Id. at 1058–59.
3. See id. at 1070–72 (describing the emergence of “new institutionalism”).
4. G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV.
485, 607 (2002).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 5 (1998) (calling for re-examination of the conventional account
of the “revolution,” according to which “the Supreme Court suddenly and substantially reversed
its position in . . . 1937 . . . [in] response to such external political pressures as the 1936 election
and the Court-packing plan”); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
19–22 (1996) (reviewing competing accounts of the lessons learned from the Court’s change of
course in 1937); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 205 (2000)
(describing the “constitutional revolution” as an interpretive revolution that resulted in “a new
orthodox conception of constitutional adaptivity”); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and
Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1891, 1898–1934 (1994) (suggesting that a significant part of the Court’s transformation
occurred before the Court-packing crisis of 1937).
7. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 122–29 (1991)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (examining the relationship between the Founding and
the New Deal); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 274–78 (1998)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (applying analysis of the New Deal to
Reconstruction).
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Given the centrality of the New Deal to this project, constitutional
historians seemed to be heading toward a fundamental reconsideration of
the relationship between constitutional law and political economy. That is,
after all, what New Deal constitutional conflict was all about: the extent to
which the Constitution allowed a national political movement to alter the
country’s economic life in fundamental and lasting ways. And yet, the new
generation of constitutional historians generally avoided political economy
as such. To be sure, their histories carefully reconstructed early twentiethcentury debates about the constitutional authority of the state and federal
governments to displace common law economic regulation. But the focus
remained on the purely legal logics and purely political events that led the
federal judiciary to get out of the business of adjudicating the constitutional
merits of various schemes of economic regulation.8 The economic reasons
that political and judicial actors might have had for transforming
constitutional democracy received little attention.9
This exclusion of economic reason from constitutional analysis is
symptomatic of what Professors Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath call
the “Great Forgetting.”10 From the Founding through the New Deal,
Fishkin and Forbath demonstrate, the discourse of “constitutional political
economy” was a fundamental feature of American constitutionalism. It was
only in the wake of the epochal New Deal synthesis—judicial deference to
political regulation of the economy and judicial guardianship of civil liberty
and equality—that constitutional political economy became something of a

8. The dominant historiographical background was the contest between “externalists,” who
asserted the primacy of politics over law in explaining the New Deal “revolution,” and
“internalists,” who “highlight[ed] the primacy of law over politics, pointing to doctrinal changes
that began well before 1937” and questioning the very premise that the New Deal was a
“revolutionary” event. Kalman, supra note 1, at 1054–55; see also WHITE, supra note 6, at 29–32
(responding to Kalman’s reconstructed narrative). Successful attempts to synthesize the two
approaches have not transcended their shared assumption that law and politics exhaust the causal
repertoire of constitutional change. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 7, at
279–311 (portraying the conflict between the Old Court and the New Deal in terms of the proper
relationship between law and politics in a democracy); DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S
NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, at 6–7 (2014)
(asserting that the “crucial factor” in the Court’s response to the New Deal was “the proper design
of the administrative state[, which] combined politics and law”).
9. For a detailed and explicit repudiation of the political-economic analysis of constitutional
change, see ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 7, at 203–21. For a notable exception, see
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 199 (1993) (“[T]he Lochner era is the story of how a changing
social structure exposed the conservatism and class bias inherent in dominant ideological
structures first formulated and institutionalized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution; it is the
story of how an ideology that was fairly (albeit not completely) inclusive around the time of the
founding became more and more exclusive as . . . capitalist forms of production matured.”).
10. JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7–8) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
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dead language.11 Prior to that time, constitutional actors across the
ideological spectrum spoke in terms of constitutional political economy,
believing that “economics and politics [we]re inextricably linked, and [that]
a republican constitution require[d] a republican political economy to
sustain it, and vice versa.”12
By recovering this language, Fishkin and Forbath’s book-in-progress,
The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, offers a radical alternative to the
constitutional histories that emerged in the 1990s to defend the New Deal
synthesis. Fishkin and Forbath’s new constitutional history13 promises to
recast the New Deal as a contingent and incomplete resolution of a
centuries-long struggle to achieve the political-economic conditions that the
Constitution requires—“requires” in the double sense of “demands” and
“depends upon.” This struggle is still ongoing and even accelerating,
Fishkin and Forbath report, yet it has become increasingly “one-sided.”14
First, the post-WWII economic boom dissipated, taking with it much of the
middle class that the New Deal and Great Society legal orders had hoped to
create.15 Then, conservative lawyers and politicians stepped up their attacks
on the New Deal and Great Society’s remaining achievements, trumpeting a
constitutional political economy in which private property free of
overweening public management is the pillar of constitutional democracy.16
Confronted by these dire conditions, legal liberals have forgotten how to
fight back, rendered mute by the New Deal synthesis itself, which ironically
and erroneously implied that political economy was no longer a matter of
constitutional concern.17 Hoping to even the odds, Fishkin and Forbath
offer liberals a grammar of egalitarian constitutional political economy—
“the constitution of opportunity”—that was once spoken fluently and
11. Id. (manuscript at 65–66).
12. Id. (manuscript at 47).
13. Professor Risa Goluboff has recently identified a different “new constitutional history,”
one that emphasizes the contingency and pluralism of constitutional law, and the agency of
“everyday” citizens and social movements in shaping that diverse and indeterminate legal field.
See Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312,
2326, 2329 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE (2012)); Risa
Goluboff, The New Constitutional History: Toward a Manifesto (Apr. 12, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Although Goluboff’s “new constitutional history” is clearly
distinct from Fishkin and Forbath’s project, the former’s emphasis on social history has also raised
questions of political economy that the constitutional history of the 1990s tended to neglect. See
generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE
WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014); REUEL SCHILLER,
FORGING RIVALS (2015); KAREN TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY (2016).
14. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 72–73).
15. Id. (manuscript at 70). For the contingency of postwar prosperity on wartime dynamics,
see THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 355–56 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014).
16. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 73–76) (describing the libertarian
revival).
17. Id. (manuscript at 65–66).
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effectively by those Americans who argued that the Constitution prohibited
oligarchic concentrations of wealth and mandated the political and judicial
construction of a broad, inclusive middle class.18
By placing the discourse of political economy back at the center of
constitutional debate, Fishkin and Forbath have—by any fair measure—
done more than enough. Yet scholarly innovators tend to find the ranks of
their critics swelled by those who have benefited most from their labor.
This Essay is no exception to the oedipal rule. It argues that Fishkin and
Forbath could go further still in integrating political economy and
constitutional history. At times, their detailed analysis of the discourse of
“constitutional political economy” comes at the expense of a more fully
materialist account of the political-economic conditions and effects of that
discourse.19 Such a discursive emphasis, in turn, risks an overly optimistic
assessment of the past virtues and present utility of “the constitution of
opportunity,” the egalitarian dialect of constitutional political economy that
Fishkin and Forbath commend to legal liberals today.
These criticisms are initial responses to an unfinished manuscript,
generously shared by Fishkin and Forbath at an unusually early stage in
order to benefit younger scholars working on similar subjects.
Accordingly, they are intended not as conclusive judgments but rather as
interjections in an ongoing conversation, one that will be significantly
advanced by the publication of The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces
Fishkin and Forbath’s ambivalent relationship with political economy to the
earlier tradition of “critical legal history,”20 a tradition that provides The
Anti-Oligarchy Constitution with a good deal of evidentiary support and
methodological inspiration. Although radical in its own way, critical legal
history’s commitment to the primacy of legal ideas, institutions, and
discourses over social and economic forces in explaining legal change may
make it more rather than less difficult to “bring political economy back

18. Id. (manuscript at 11–13).
19. This critique seeks to reopen the debate about the “constitutive” power of law that Forbath
and other “critical legal historians” won in the early 1990s, displacing an earlier tradition of
American legal history that viewed law as “reflective” of more basic social and economic
relations and needs. See generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT ix–xiii (1991); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND
IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 22 n.17 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (1984). Questioning the constitutive—or constructive—power
of legal discourse, however, need not entail a return to the Whiggish instrumentalism of
midcentury American legal history or the more reductionist variants of Marxist legal theory. See
infra Part I.
20. For overviews of the tradition, see Gordon, supra note 19; Jessica K. Lowe, Radicalism’s
Legacy: American Legal History Since 1998, 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE
288 (2014); and G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated
Intellectual History, 40 SW. L.J. 819 (1986).
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in”21 to constitutional history. Notably, Forbath’s own contributions to
critical legal history have always been distinctive in their sensitivity to the
generative power of class conflict.22 It is surely this special sensitivity to
the material conditions of legal change, rather than critical legal history’s
generic interest in exploring the richness and presumed autonomy of legal
discourse, that should guide the study of constitutional political economy
going forward. Parts II and III sketch an alternative interpretation of some
of Fishkin and Forbath’s discursive evidence in light of neglected politicaleconomic factors.
Part II proposes that for much of American history, the constitution of
opportunity was an essentially antifeudal discourse spoken by various
factions of the emerging bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Fishkin and
Forbath do demonstrate that, at times, this discourse predicted and tried to
mitigate the economic inequalities intrinsic to capitalist development.23 But
the balance of their evidence suggests that, more often than not, the function
of the constitution of opportunity was either to accelerate this development
or to offer false hope about its consequences, or both. Put differently, the
constitutional language of political-economic “opportunity” that Fishkin
and Forbath trace from the 1770s through the late nineteenth century
echoed the uneven development of capitalism in a nation beset by “belated
feudalism.”24 The utility of such an antifeudal discourse for contending
with the inequalities of modern capitalism may be more limited than
Fishkin and Forbath suggest.

21. Cf. BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al. eds.,
1985).
22. See generally FORBATH, supra note 19; William E. Forbath, Courting the State: An Essay
for Morton Horwitz, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 70 (Daniel W.
Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010); William Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship,
98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste]; William E. Forbath, Politics, StateBuilding, and the Courts, 1870–1920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643
(Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of
Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767 (1985) [hereinafter
Forbath, Ambiguities].
23. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 5).
24. See generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM (1991). For weaker versions of this
argument, see AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT (1998); and ROBERT J.
STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR (1991). Forbath himself has described in great
detail the process by which “[c]apitalist production arose unevenly in different places and
industries over several decades, generally between the 1820’s and 1870’s,” while offering
evidence that, at least in some sectors, the “ancient” common law of labor relations that Orren
finds dominant throughout the nineteenth century was actually an invention of late nineteenth
century courts. Forbath, Ambiguities, supra note 22, at 801–06. Splitting the difference,
Christopher Tomlins has argued that only in the late eighteenth century did an American variant of
the British common law tradition become dominant, heralding the subordination of labor relations
to capital and displacing radical, alternative visions of the American mode of production, visions
that would be revived without success in the 1820s and 1930s. See TOMLINS, supra note 19, at
23–26, 232–97.
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Part III turns to the New Deal and the Great Forgetting of
constitutional political economy that followed in its wake. On a strict
interpretation of the belated feudalism thesis, the victory won by the
constitution of opportunity in 1937 represents little more than the
achievement of properly capitalist labor relations outside the Jim Crow
South.25 But even if the New Deal’s iteration of the constitution of
opportunity did not only create a more stable capitalist society but also
mitigated its economically inegalitarian tendencies, the popularity of this
discourse was disturbingly brief. Fishkin and Forbath’s evidence suggests
that the constitution of opportunity enjoyed something like discursive
supremacy during the nine years between the 1936 presidential campaign
and President Roosevelt’s declaration of the “Second Bill of Rights” in
1944.26 But then it went silent.27 The Great Forgetting occurred and
constitutional political economy dropped out of mainstream constitutional
discourse altogether, spoken only by economic libertarians intent on rolling
back the New Deal as a constitutional aberration.28 This Part argues that
Fishkin and Forbath’s explanation of the Great Forgetting neglects the
determinate political-economic event of the post-WWII period: the United
States’ war against communism, a war between monopoly capitalism and
state socialism launched precisely at the moment when the economically
egalitarian interpretation of constitutional political economy apparently
became unspeakable.29 The word “communism” does not currently appear
in Fishkin and Forbath’s text. Yet the history of the relationship between
American political economy and American constitutionalism in the second
half of the twentieth century cannot be told without it.
I.

From Critical Legal History to “Constitutional Political Economy”

From the perspective of American legal historiography, The AntiOligarchy Constitution represents not only an alternative to the
constitutional history of the 1990s, but also the culmination of a decadeslong project to recover the radical legal perspectives of American workers
from the Founding Era to the early twentieth century. This project rejected
the traditional, “exceptionalist” account of American workers as lacking in

25. ORREN, supra note 24, at 29–30; cf. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE
UNIONS xi–xii (1985) (reaching a similar conclusion about the ultimate function of New Deal
labor law, but arguing that radical alternatives to both precapitalist and capitalist labor relations
were on the table in the early twentieth century). For Southern labor relations during the New
Deal, see IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF 131–94 (2013).
26. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 58–61).
27. Id. (manuscript at 64–65).
28. Id. (manuscript at 73).
29. See generally CAMBELL CRAIG & FREDRIK LOGEVALL, AMERICA’S COLD WAR (2009);
Anders Stephanson, Cold War Degree Zero, in UNCERTAIN EMPIRE 19 (Joel Isaac & Duncan Bell
eds., 2012).
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“class consciousness” and possessed of an individualistic ideology that
distinguished them from their European peers.30 Drawing on new
scholarship in labor history, William Forbath and fellow critical legal
historians in the 1980s and 1990s insisted that the “history of the workplace
in industrializing America is one of recurring militancy and of class-based,
as well as shop- and craft-based, collective action.”31 Given this long
record of radicalism, new puzzles emerged:
[W]hy, by the early 20th century, did most [workers] end up
supporting unions and political parties that were more conservative
than those embraced by their counterparts abroad? If the American
labor movement was not born with a comparatively narrow interest
group outlook or an inveterate bias against broad, positive uses of
law and state power, then how did that outlook and bias become
dominant in the labor movement by the early 1900s?32
In answering these questions, critical legal historians distinguished
themselves by looking beyond the traditional social and economic
explanations: greater economic mobility and greater ethnic and racial
conflict gradually eroded worker solidarity.33 Decentering these more
materialist accounts, Forbath and others argued that law took the whip hand
when it came to breaking worker radicalism in late nineteenth century
America.34 Then, workers pressed a radical legal vision that would have
given them greater autonomy in the workplace and a greater share of the
returns to capital, but they were defeated in the courts.35 Confronted by late
nineteenth century labor militancy, a probusiness judiciary constitutionalized outdated and sometimes mythical common law rules that
constrained labor activism, prolabor health and safety regulations, and

30. William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America: A
Study of the Constitutive Power of Law, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 5–6 (1991).
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id. at 7–9.
34. See generally FORBATH, supra note 19; VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND
STATE POWER (1993); TOMLINS, supra note 19; TOMLINS, supra note 25.
35. See FORBATH, supra note 19, at 6–8 (arguing that judicial review “helped make broad
legal reforms seem futile”); HATTAM, supra note 34, at ix (arguing that “a strong judiciary created
a politically weak labor movement in the United States”); TOMLINS, supra note 25, at 68 (“The
combination of sustained judicial condemnation and employer hostility . . . contributed to a
pronounced fall in [unions’] overall rate of growth, beginning soon after the turn of the century.”).
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prolabor schemes of economic redistribution.36 In response, the labor
movement was forced to trim its sails.37
Why did a group of legal historians committed to rediscovering the
radicalism of American workers privilege legal over social and economic
explanation, even where—as in Forbath’s case38—their histories took
careful note of the material interests of the relevant legal actors, including
the class position of the judiciary? One obvious answer is that the
prevailing nonlegal explanations were not supported by sufficient empirical
evidence.39 But critical legal historians tended to harbor a much broader
methodological—and even metaphysical—objection to social and economic
explanations of legal change. This objection stemmed from their critique of
the then-dominant “law-and-society” school of legal history.40 Law-andsociety historians viewed law as reflective of, and responsive to, the
“needs” or “interests” of American society.41 In its most politically
conservative form, this “functionalist” or “instrumentalist” historiography
described legal change as a rational process of resolving social and
economic problems that ineluctably led to greater social and economic
welfare.42 While many law-and-society historians distanced themselves
from such a Panglossian description of American legal development,
critical legal historians nonetheless viewed the law-and-society approach as

36. See Forbath, Ambiguities, supra note 22, at 805 (noting the ahistoricism of “supposedly
time-honored and inviolable [property] rights” developed by courts in the late nineteenth century);
see also FORBATH, supra note 19, at 6–8 (noting that the “courts’ harshly repressive law of
industrial conflict helped make broad, inclusive unionism seem too costly”); HATTAM, supra note
34, at 30 (describing the use of the common law doctrine of criminal conspiracy “to regulate the
increased harm that often accompanied collective action”).
37. See, e.g., FORBATH, supra note 19, at 96–97 (“In the shadow of so many broken big
strikes and bootless broad initiatives, many thought it wise to conserve and build upon what
‘worked’—minimalist politics, craft unionism, high dues, and restrained but well-calculated strike
policies.”); HATTAM, supra note 34, at 204 (arguing that labor “[v]oluntarism . . . was the AFL’s
strategic response to the unusual configuration of state power in the United States,” namely the
existence of “an obstructionist court from 1865 through 1895”).
38. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
39. Cf. Forbath, supra note 30, at 79 (noting the inadequacy of many traditional
socioeconomic explanations for the comparative weakness of the American labor movement, such
as the hypothesis that American workers enjoyed unprecedented opportunities to enter the middle
class).
40. For a highly sensitive critique of law-and-society historiography, see Gordon, supra note
19, at 59–87. For an earlier, more uncompromising critique, see Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives
on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman’s “A History of American
Law,” 1977 WIS. L. REV. 81 (1977).
41. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 5974; Lowe, supra note 20, at 288; White, supra note 20,
at 832.
42. Gordon, supra note 19, at 59–65.
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tainted by teleology and political quietism—an at-best unwitting defense of
the “liberal capitalism”43 that had come to dominate modern American
society.44
Given their political objections to the law-and-society approach, an
obvious place for critical legal theorists to turn would have been Marxism,
and a few did.45 But one of the most striking aspects of critical legal history
was its propensity to attack the “instrumentalism” of Marxist legal theory
with almost as much vigor as it attacked the “liberal instrumentalism” of
law-and-society scholars.46 While Marxist instrumentalism might have
“considerably more explanatory bite” than the liberal alternative, it was
nonetheless beset by “a great many problems,” the greatest being its
assumption that the content of law was determined by—and ineluctably
served the interests of—a dominant, capitalist class.47 Just like liberal
instrumentalism, then, Marxist instrumentalism treated law as a mere
reflection of more basic social and economic relations.48 Rejecting both
43. Id. at 59.
44. See White, supra note 20, at 83335. For a powerful interpretation of the political
background of critical legal history, tracing its roots to disillusionment with midcentury
modernization theory, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 437–77
(1995).
45. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, in 1 MARXIST
PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978).
46. Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 641, 64446 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
47. Id. at 646; see also id. at 653–54 (explaining that critical legal theory differs from “most
forms of Marxist thought” in several other respects as well: in its refusal to “treat capitalism as a
totalizing system”; in its recognition that “the forms of liberal-democratic-capitalism that we are
used to are only a few among the many ways of being liberal-democratic-capitalist” and that
“among the forms that might be brought into being, ours are both worse and better”; in its
affirmation that “[t]he resources for ‘revolutionary reform’ are . . . often to be found in our own
traditions, customs, and practices”; and in its rejection of the idea that legal reform must be
“oriented toward capture of central state machinery”). Such wide-ranging criticisms of
Marxism—going well beyond the supposed instrumentalism of Marxist legal theory—were
characteristic of critical legal history in its heyday. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 20
(citing V. I. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (1937)) (“Contrary to classic theories of revolution . . .
transformative action does not need to be qualitatively distinct from the normal or routine
activities which reinforce [social] contexts.”).
48. This rather simplistic characterization of Marxist legal theory was in keeping with the
highly influential, mid-1970s polemics of the English historian E. P. Thompson. See generally
E. P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY & OTHER ESSAYS (1978); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS (1975). Thompson unfortunately issued these attacks on Marxist legal theory
without the benefit of access to his primary antagonists’ contemporaneous writings, which offered
significant correctives to earlier, more reductive accounts of the relationship between law and
political economy. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ON THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM 53–170
(G. M. Goshgarian trans., Verso 2014); NICOS POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (Patrick
Camiller trans., Verso 2014). Given Thompson’s contempt for both men, and his ideological
commitment to the rule of law as “an unqualified human good,” THOMPSON, WHIGS AND
HUNTERS, supra at 266, it is unlikely that familiarity with their later work would have altered his
views. Critical legal historians, however, have always been uncomfortable with Thompson’s
normative evaluation of Anglo-American law, if not his historical methodology. See, e.g.,
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liberal and Marxist instrumentalism, critical legal historians argued that law
was “constitutive”—not reflective—of social and economic relations.49
Furthermore, law’s constitutive power was inherently “indeterminate,”
capable of being used by legal actors in a variety of different ways, toward
a variety of different social, economic, and political ends.50 In light of the
constitutive and indeterminate nature of law, critical legal historians
insisted that explanations of legal change would not generally be found in
“deeper”51 social or economic factors, but rather in the field of law itself,
where self-consciously legal actors contended with each other and with
legal institutions over the meaning of legal “language.”52
The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution owes a clear debt to Forbath’s earlier
work and to other critical legal histories of American labor relations. The
book supplements the evidence base of these histories in two main ways:
first, by emphasizing the extent to which workers, their advocates, and their
adversaries spoke in distinctively constitutional terms;53 second, by
incorporating a more complex account of the role that race played in
shaping these discursive battles.54 While Fishkin and Forbath do not
explicitly adopt critical legal history’s methodological tenets (and while
Forbath was always more materialist than other critical legal historians), the
importance of legal discourse to explaining legal change persists and
presents something of a contradiction. On the one hand, Fishkin and
Forbath’s manuscript seeks to break with the constitutional history of the
1990s, a historiography that marginalized the political-economic nature of
American constitutionalism.55 On the other hand, the manuscript remains
marked by the critical legal history of the 1980s and 1990s, a historiography
that asserted the primacy of legal discourse over social and economic forces
TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 22, 22 n.18 (embracing Thompson’s “unexceptionable critique of
instrumentalism” but criticizing his utopian evaluation of “the rule of law”); Morton J. Horwitz,
The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 565 (1977) (book review)
(criticizing Thompson’s failure to apply his normative analysis of the rule of law to the relevant
historical data). Accordingly, legal historians in the critical tradition might yet find something of
value in Marxist alternatives to law-and-society instrumentalism and their own post-Marxist
constructivism, especially to the extent that they seek to specify the causal relationship between
economic inequality and legal change. The alternative, a tragic legal liberalism, is spelled out in
Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Morton Horwitz Wrestles with the Rule of Law, in 2
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 483 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L.
Brophy eds., 2010).
49. FORBATH, supra note 19, at ix–xiii; TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 26; Gordon, supra note
19, at 100–09.
50. FORBATH, supra note 19, at 170–72; TOMLINS, supra note 19, at 19–20; Gordon, supra
note 19, at 114.
51. Forbath, supra note 30, at 4.
52. FORBATH, supra note 19, at 170–71.
53. Forbath laid the groundwork for this move in his bravura article, Caste, Class, and Equal
Citizenship. See Forbath, Caste, supra note 22.
54. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 13–58).
55. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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in explaining legal change.56 The result is a constitutional history that
insists on the centrality of political economy but analyzes it primarily as a
species of legal discourse rather than as a material structure of power.
Ironically, then, the legacy of critical legal history risks pulling Fishkin and
Forbath’s project back in the direction of mainstream constitutional history.
Although these two, roughly contemporaneous historiographical traditions
had quite different political valences, they actually shared the same postMarxist tendency to discount the material conditions of legal change.
Beginning with the methodological assumption that both traditions
rejected—the assumption that political economy is determinative57 of legal
ideas, institutions, and discourses—might lead Fishkin and Forbath to a
different interpretation of their evidence. This Essay does not purport to
defend this alternative assumption—the defenses are well-known and were
available, if unpopular, at the time of critical legal history’s formation58—or
to offer an exhaustive reinterpretation of The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution.
It suggests only that critical legal history’s emphasis on the “relative
autonomy” of law,59 absent a symmetrical emphasis on the “relative
autonomy” of political economy, is responsible for some of the more
puzzling features of Fishkin and Forbath’s history of constitutional political
economy. These features may become less puzzling once the politicaleconomic conditions of legal discourse are more fully incorporated into the
story.

56. See supra notes 42–54 and accompanying text.
57. “Determinative” is often read to mean “absolutely” or “exhaustively” determinative.
There is no reason to do so. At the Symposium, David Grewal helpfully proposed the phrase
“negative determinism,” connoting the idea that material forces take some legal and political
possibilities off the table, but do not determine the selection among those that remain.
Alternatively, the concept of “determination in the last instance” suggests a stronger, positive
determinism that nonetheless ascribes agency, contingency, and efficacy to legal and political
conflicts. See ALTHUSSER, supra note 48, at 5356, 14063, 20931 (arguing that the
“reproduction of the relations of production” depends on relatively autonomous legal and political
apparatuses and the defeat of working class insurgencies that occur within them).
58. See, e.g., LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM (Grahame Lock trans., 1976);
PERRY ANDERSON, ARGUMENTS WITHIN ENGLISH MARXISM (1980); POULANTZAS, supra note
48.
59. Gordon, supra note 19, at 101. Critical legal historians’ adoption of the language of
relative autonomy was peculiar given the origins and function of that term in Marxist state theory.
See RALPH MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 51 (1969); NICOS POULANTZAS,
POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES 190–91 (Timothy O’Hagan trans., 1973). For these
theorists, saying that legal or political institutions could achieve relative autonomy did not entail
any limit to materialist explanation. To the contrary, the capacity of such institutions to act
against the short-term interests of dominant class fractions was explicable in terms of the longerterm interests of capitalist development. Id. As used by critical legal historians, however, law’s
relative autonomy generally implied an epistemological or metaphysical break, such that at least
some legal phenomena exceeded materialist explanation.
See supra notes 42–54 and
accompanying text.
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The Constitution of Opportunity Between Feudalism and Capitalism

In the same year that Forbath placed the “constitutive” power of law at
the center of the history of American labor relations,60 Karren Orren’s
Belated Feudalism offered an alternative interpretation of that history.61
While Orren did not deny the power of legal actors to shape American
political economy, she placed greater emphasis on the fact that these actors
operate within “real” political-economic structures that “channel and react
to events and lend a direction to historical change.”62 In particular, Orren
argued that for most of its political-economic history, the United States
featured relations of production with a markedly feudal cast, pervaded by
the same law of master and servant that had governed wage labor since the
fourteenth century.63 That is, wage labor in the United States was long
defined by the distinctive feature of the feudal mode of production: the
direct extraction of labor power by legal and political coercion, in the form
of the criminalization of vagrancy and the judicial prescription of the
conditions of employment.64 According to Orren, this feudal regime of
American labor governance provided “the foundation of capitalist
development”: the expansion of free markets in commodities depended on
unfree labor markets in both the North and the South.65 On this account, the
unionization movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

60. FORBATH, supra note 19, at x.
61. See generally ORREN, supra note 24.
62. Karren Orren, Institutions, Antinomies, and Influences in Labor Governance, 19 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 187, 189 (1994).
63. ORREN, supra note 24, at 12, 71–79. For the classic debates about the relationship
between the development of waged labor and the development of capitalism, see generally THE
BRENNER DEBATE (T. H. Aston & C. H. E. Philipin eds., 1985); THE TRANSITION FROM
FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM (Verso 1978).
64. See ORREN, supra note 24, at 68–117. Under a capitalist regime of labor governance, by
contrast, labor power is extracted by means of economic coercion—the unequal bargaining power
between capital and labor that determines employment contracts in a free labor market.
65. Id. at 70; see also Orren, supra note 62, at 190 (“I see the late 19th century as a period in
which commercial relations were governed along voluntary principles and labor along prescriptive
ones. But more than that: the voluntarism of commercial relations in the 19th century presumed
hierarchy in labor relations for its effective functioning . . . .”). In hypothesizing the asynchronous
development of capitalism in labor and commercial relations, Orren happily pillaged traditional
Marxist theory, and presaged contemporary American scholarship on the history of slavery and
capitalism. See, e.g., WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS 2–3 (2013) (emphasizing the
interrelationship between the development of global commodities markets and the persistence of
slave labor in the South). At the same time, Marxist theorists and historians have gradually
renounced the traditional view of a sharp break between feudalism and capitalism, noting the
persistence of feudal political and labor relations well into the twentieth century. For an overview,
see generally A History of Separation: The Rise and Fall of the Workers’ Movement, 1883-1982,
ENDNOTES, Oct. 2015.
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represented not a thwarted attempt to achieve social democracy but the
long-delayed transition of American labor relations from feudalism to
capitalism.66
In its purest form, the thesis of Belated Feudalism remains
controversial,67 although Forbath and others have cited it approvingly for
the softer thesis that “the law of the employment relationship in nineteenthand early twentieth-century America remained one of hierarchy and
subordination, of status as much as of free contract.”68 In any event, this
Part invokes Belated Feudalism not as a more accurate narrative of
American labor relations than that provided by the critical legal historians,
but rather as one example of a political economic metanarrative within
which Fishkin and Forbath’s account of constitutional political economy
could be fruitfully situated. Indeed, one continually catches glimpses of
this metanarrative—the surprisingly long political-economic struggle for
capitalism and against feudalism—while reading The Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution.
To begin with, the founding tenets of the constitution of opportunity
tradition were explicitly antifeudal in character: the abolition of
“hierarchies, titles, and aristocratic forms of privilege,” including
“primogeniture and entail”; and the formation of a “republic” of
enfranchised property holders, a mix of merchant and agrarian elites and
white male settlers who were able “to exit the wage labor market” due to
“relatively high wages” and the availability of “[c]heap fertile land.”69 This
nascent capitalist order, however, depended on the persistence of an
essentially feudal class of “property-less, super-exploited labor generally
not freemen but enslaved for life.”70 This order also featured an unresolved
disagreement: whether the legal abolition of feudal property relations was
sufficient to secure a property-owning republic71 (abolition of feudal labor
relations, according to Orren, was not yet on the table);72 or whether,
instead, continued political management of property relations would be
necessary.73 Over the next century, those who held the latter view would
promulgate a welter of competing programs with shifting political
66. See ORREN, supra note 24, at 209–30.
67. For an early critique, see Catherine Fisk, Still “Learning Something of Legislation”: The
Judiciary in the History of Labor Laws, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 151 (1994). For a more
thoroughgoing attack on the idea of continuity between feudal labor relations and American labor
law, see CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND (2010).
68. Forbath, Caste, supra note 22, at 21 & nn.86 & 89 (citing ORREN, supra note 24F); see
also STANLEY, supra note 24, at 83–84 & n.41 (citing ORREN, supra note 24).
69. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 13–14).
70. Id. (manuscript at 14).
71. Id. (manuscript at 15) (“An end to primogeniture and entail, Webster argued, would
produce, over time, that ‘equality of property’ that is ‘the very soul of a republic.’”).
72. ORREN, supra note 24, at 68–71.
73. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 15).
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economic valences: from plans for general education so that the children of
poorer families might one day hold civil office (quite radical at the
Founding, though derided by Fishkin and Forbath in its late twentiethcentury variant as not a political-economic program for achieving a
democracy of opportunity);74 to more activist schemes of property
redistribution (very radical if rarely implemented);75 to more mandarin
schemes of monetary policy and infrastructure investment (not radical when
pursued by Federalists at the national level, somewhat radical when pursued
by the Democratic–Republican Party at the state level, less radical when
pursued by the “new Republicanism” once again at the national level, more
radical when pursued by populists and progressives in the early twentieth
century).76
Fishkin and Forbath place great emphasis on the political defeat of the
Federalists, after which “no mainstream party ever again openly proclaimed
itself the party of elite rule.”77 From then on, they explain, parties “might
defend the wealthy, but not the wealthy’s right to rule . . . always
proclaim[ing] fealty to ‘equal rights’ and broad distribution of prosperity
for the producing classes.”78 But this “dialectic . . . of constitutional
political-economic discourse”79 is as striking for its political-economic
ambiguity as for its radicalism. As Fishkin and Forbath note, this dialectic
was used by the new Republicans to defend the second national bank, and
they spoke it all the way into the Panic of 1819, “the nation’s first
‘traumatic awakening to the capitalist reality of boom and bust.’”80 As
articulated by a party dominated by “rising enterprisers and Southern
planters” and swelled by smallholders, opposition to “the wealthy’s right to
rule” and support for “equal rights” and “prosperity” for independent
producers sound less like a radical agenda than the minimal legal conditions
for a capitalist polity where political membership was tied to modest
property qualifications.81
Of course, this negative assessment is terribly teleological, and what
matters most for Fishkin and Forbath is the elasticity of the dialectic of

74. Id. (manuscript at 15–18, 71).
75. Id. (manuscript at 15).
76. Id. (manuscript at 18–23, 75–76).
77. Id. (manuscript at 24).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (manuscript at 23) (quoting CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION 137
(1991)).
81. Id. (manuscript at 23–24); cf. Michael Zakim & Gary J. Kornblith, Introduction: An
American Revolutionary Tradition, in CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND 1, 10 (Michael Zakim &
Gary J. Kornblith eds., 2012) (arguing that the “contradictions—dare we say, dialectics—of a
society organizing itself around the liquidity, fungibility, and incessant maximizations of the
commodity were largely lost on an American gentry anticipating a bright future of material
abundance”).
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“opportunity”—its ability to accommodate “thicker distributional claims”
when formal talk of equal rights “grew strained and thin.”82 And, according
to Fishkin and Forbath, that is just what the dialectic did during the
Jacksonian period:
Jackson’s war on the Bank was the centerpiece of a broader
questioning of how American capitalism was taking shape. With the
Panic of 1819 and the economic pain that followed, a breach had
opened between the party elites and ordinary farmer- and workervoters over the paths of national and regional development the elites
were blazing. . . . A farmer-worker populace, voting directly, in
mass numbers, in a presidential election for the first time . . .
muster[ed] democracy against “the paper system” and its “new
aristocracy” of enterprise. . . . Not until FDR would a presidential
candidate again speak so plainly about the realities of class divisions
and the incompatibility of political democracy and economic
oligarchy. Voters who readily accepted that they were the “poor
Many” fighting off the “wealthy Few” exercised their suffrage for
what the new Democratic Party press heralded as a “Constitutional
Millennium.”83
Jacksonian Democracy undoubtedly marked a major transformation in
our constitutional system, but the political-economic benefits of this
“Constitutional Millennium” prove difficult to pin down.84 First, as Fishkin
and Forbath readily acknowledge, “Jacksonians wedded white farmers’ and
workers’ democratic aspirations to the racist causes of southern slavery and
Indian Removal.”85 Accordingly, “[s]laves’ and women’s productive work
was . . . excluded from the Jacksonians’ generous conception of equality for
the nation’s producers,”86 as the promise of white male property
ownership—still recognized as the basis of real political-economic
freedom—became irredeemably tied to violent territorial expansion.87
Second, the growth of the franchise that undergirded Jacksonian
populism was itself a mixed political-economic bag, sundering the concepts
of political and economic freedom in troubling ways. At the Founding,
Gouverneur Morris and James Madison had fought for higher property
qualifications for national elections precisely to forestall a return to
“aristocracy.”88 Madison explained that the British Parliament had become

82. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 24).
83. Id. (manuscript at 24–25).
84. The canonical negative assessment is SELLERS, supra note 80. For criticism of Sellers’s
method, if not the balance of his conclusions, see Zakim & Kornblith, supra note 81, at 6–7.
85. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 27).
86. Id.
87. See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 99–175 (2010).
88. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 18–19 (rev. ed. 2009).
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corrupted because property qualifications were too low.89 Expanding on the
point, Morris warned:
Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell
them to the rich. . . . The time is not distant when this country will
abound with mechanics and manufacturers, who will receive their
bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure and
faithful guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier
against aristocracy?90
As this quote indicates, the heart of the argument for property-based
suffrage was the reality that wage laborers were not free but bound,
economically and legally, to their masters: “Those who were subject to
another’s government—that is, all those either legally or economically
dependent on others—should, as people who were ruled in their private
lives, be excluded from governance.”91 The propertyless represented what
Orren called the feudal remnant of American society, and as such were the
closest link to the feudal past that the Founders hoped to escape.92 In a
compromise, the question of economic qualifications for national suffrage
was left to the state governments; at the time of the Founding, somewhere
between thirty and forty percent of white men could not vote.93
The gradual elimination of property-based political citizenship was
tied to a commercial and demographic explosion that swelled the cities and
pushed the nation westward. The population more than doubled between
1790 and 1820, from less than four million to just under ten, and doubled
again by 1850.94 By then, nearly all economic barriers to white male
suffrage, whether in the form of property holding or tax payments, had
fallen.95 Yet the new property-poor and propertyless voters—the “Poor
Many” who swept Jackson and his party into power96—found themselves in
a “contradictory state of affairs,” their “political rights of self-government
joined to economic vulnerability and dependence.”97 The decoupling of
property ownership from republican self-government led to the political
emancipation of the poor, but it also made the “power of property to
govern . . . more difficult to see and attack.”98 As Robert Steinfeld puts it:
As the nineteenth century wore on, wage workers complained more
and more bitterly that the power of property was making them slaves
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 18.
Id.
STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 185.
ORREN, supra note 24, at 228–30.
KEYSSAR, supra note 88, at 19–21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 24–25.
FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 24–25).
STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 186.
Id. at 186–87.
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to their employers. . . . But their argument was . . . difficult and []
contradictory. Having prevailed in their contention that they were
among the self-governing . . . and having gained the franchise on this
basis, wage workers found it more difficult to argue that their
propertylessness subjected them to the rule of others.99
The Jacksonian discourse of constitutional political economy that
Fishkin and Forbath celebrate undoubtedly gave voice to the politicaleconomic frustrations of this new mass polity.100 But it is less clear that
constitutional attacks on the “moneyed aristocracy” of Northern industry
and banking offered this polity much economic relief.101 Summarizing the
Jacksonian diagnosis of the country’s ills, Fishkin and Forbath write that
“[t]he central problem was that economic inequality inevitably has
corrosive effects on political equality.”102 But the erosion of political rights
that the propertyless had only recently won—a victory partly attributable to
the economic forces that also oppressed them—was simply not the central
problem they faced. Nor was it “the accumulation of overgrown individual
fortunes.”103 Their most pressing problems were rather local employers,
landlords, and lenders, and the laws that governed relations between
them.104 Having just cast off one vestige of actual feudalism, politically
emancipated white men still faced feudal labor relations in some regions
and industries, and equally or more exploitative capitalist labor relations in
others.105 The antifeudal accents of Jacksonian constitutional political
economy certainly had rhetorical appeal, but it remains unclear to what
extent they offered economic respite to the new electoral class.106

99. Id. at 187.
100. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 24–25).
101. Id. (manuscript at 25–26).
102. Id. (manuscript at 26).
103. Id. (quoting 8 REG. DEB. 3359 (1832) (statement of Rep. Bell)).
104. For employer–employee relations, see the discussions of sources supra note 24. For
landlords and lenders, see Elizabeth Blackmar, Inheriting Property and Debt: From Family
Security to Corporate Accumulation, in CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND, supra note 81, at 93–95;
Jonathan Levy, The Mortgage Worked the Hardest: The Fate of Landed Independence in
Nineteenth-Century America, in CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND, supra note 81, at 39.
105. For the persistence of feudal labor relations, see generally ORREN, supra note 24;
STEINFELD, supra note 24. For the antebellum shift in the labor force toward “highly productive
industrial and commercial elements of the economy,” see Robert E. Gallman & John Joseph
Wallis, Introduction, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STANDARDS OF LIVING BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 1, 3 (Robert E. Gallman & John Joseph Wallis eds., 1992) [hereinafter AMERICAN
ECONOMIC GROWTH].
106. One obstacle to bringing political economy back into early republican constitutional
history is the relative paucity of data that confronts economic historians of the period, especially
with respect to the propertyless and property poor. For overviews of the problem, see Robert A.
Margo, Wages and Prices During the Antebellum Period: A Survey and New Evidence, in
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 105, at 173; Lee Soltow, Inequalities in the Standard
of Living in the United States, 1798–1875, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 105, at
121.
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Fishkin and Forbath seem to recognize this uncertain fit between
rhetoric and reality when they turn to the third ambiguity of Jacksonian
constitutional political economy: that it could be so quickly co-opted by
democracy’s opponents, the Whigs. While “Whigs spurned [the] ‘leveling’
outlook” of Jacksonians, “[t]hey shared with their foes the . . . republican
maxim [that] the citizen’s political equality and independence must rest on
a measure of economic independence, and that demanded propertyholding.”107
[The Whigs’] vision was a burgeoning commercial republic, not a
backward-looking agrarian one, but it was no less a republic with a
broad, wide-open, propertied middle class. Thus, they loudly
affirmed that a true “American” system of political economy must
provide as ample as possible a supply of decent livelihoods for the
laboring classes, along with wide opportunities for laborers to
become proprietors, and broad avenues to wealth and distinction for
the gifted and ambitious “poor beginners.” Not surprisingly, Whigs
contended that their own economic policies were best suited to these
core commitments.
And more than that: They argued that
Jacksonian nostrums like free trade, hard money and “limited
government” only hurt the very classes the Jacksonians claimed to
champion.108
In many respects, the Whigs were right, or at least closer to being right
than the Jacksonians. The latter’s anti-aristocratic attacks on the largest
industrialists and bankers likely brought more economic chaos than relief to
the growing urban proletariat and rural poor.109 Perhaps most notably,
Jacksonian constitutional political economy actually accelerated the pace of
incorporation and the consequent intensification of corporate competition
and capitalist labor relations. 110
Over the long run, of course, the Whig and then Republican
constitutions of opportunity would falter too. President Lincoln’s vision of
universal smallholding and small-scale manufacture—premised on the
elimination of indigenous resistance to Western labor migration and
unrealistic expectations about the egalitarian potential of capitalist
development—did put an end to the massive feudal remnant that was black
slavery.111 But after a brief flirtation with more radical solutions,112
107. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 30).
108. Id.
109. See Jane Knodell, Rethinking the Jacksonian Economy: The Impact of the 1832 Bank
Veto on Commercial Banking, 66 J. ECON. HIST. 541, 547–48 (2006) (noting that the bank veto
had “destabilizing monetary effects”); Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie
Flows, and the Panic of 1837, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 457, 458 (2002) (arguing that Jacksonian
monetary policy played a role in the Panic of 1837).
110. See Robert E. Wright, Capitalism and the Rise of the Corporation Nation, in
CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND, supra note 81, at 145, 160–67.
111. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 35–44).
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Republicans bridled at the massive redistribution that would have been
necessary to approximate a multiracial property-owning republic.
Consigning recently freed slaves to neofeudal peonage, Republicans also
refused to stamp out the vestiges of feudal labor relations in the North,
decrying labor voluntarism as the gateway to socialism and transforming
victorious Union soldiers into strikebreakers.113 The industrial oligarchy of
the late nineteenth century won the electoral support of Northern workers
and farmers not by recognizing their claims for constitutional authority in
matters of economic governance, but rather by doling out military pensions
and tariff protections to soften the blow of their increasingly subaltern
status.114 Such strategies of population management were at least as old as
the absolutist states of early modern Europe.115
In sum, the constitution of opportunity seems to have been a vivid
discourse for grappling with the intricate relationship between a belated
feudalism and a booming capitalism in nineteenth-century America. But
the speakers of this discourse rarely, if ever, understood the full complexity
of their political-economic situation, and consistently failed to master it. Of
course, this conclusion has all the unearned benefit of hindsight. But if we
know now that the constitution of opportunity so often proved misleading
or ineffectual in the nineteenth century, why should we expect it to fare
better today? The most hopeful answer is that such a discourse works best
once capitalism is (almost) the only game in town and everyone knows it.
This leads to the question of how the constitution of opportunity weathered
the twentieth century.

112. See id. (manuscript at 46–54).
113. See id. (manuscript at 44–46, 51–52); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 460–605
(updated ed. 2014) (exploring the relationship between Reconstruction politics and Northern labor
politics); ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH 174
(2015) (noting post-Civil War conflicts over labor republicanism); DAVID MONTGOMERY,
CITIZEN WORKER 115–62 (1993) (analyzing the political response to the post-Civil War labor
movement).
114. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 4–15 (2000).
115. See, e.g., ROBIN BLACKBURN, BANKING ON DEATH, OR INVESTING IN LIFE 36–39
(2004) (discussing pension systems in the early modern period); RONALD FINDLAY & KEVIN H.
O’ROURKE, POWER AND PLENTY 227–310 (2007) (discussing import tariffs in the early modern
period).
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III. The Constitution of Opportunity Between Capitalism and Communism
The current version of Fishkin and Forbath’s manuscript concludes
with a powerful recommendation: “Rebuilding the democracy of
opportunity . . . requires reimagining and democratizing the forms of
ownership and control that prevail over the means of work and social
production, much as both radicals and elite liberal reformers set out to do
during the last Gilded Age.”116 Democratization of the means of
production—what came to be called “economic democracy” during the
New Deal117—was and remains a radical program, but it is also rife with
political-economic ambiguity. As Fishkin and Forbath emphasize, such a
program does not necessarily entail collective ownership of the means of
production—socialism or communism. Indeed, Fishkin and Forbath
suggest that, by the turn of the twentieth century, proponents of the
constitution of opportunity had come to accept that the United States “was
destined to have a vast, permanent class of propertyless wage earners.”118
In this respect, even the most radical constitutional political economists had
made their peace with capitalism, in one form or another.
Here, the consequences for political-economic analysis of focusing on
the discourse of constitutional political economy are striking. In the current
version of their manuscript, Fishkin and Forbath have yet to discuss the
specifically anti-constitutionalist and anti-capitalist movements for
political-economic transformation that roiled twentieth-century America,
including the Socialist Party of America and, later, the Communist Party.119
Such movements contributed to the relative popularity of left-wing (yet still
constitutional and capitalist) political economy—the least threatening of
several radical alternatives—while also repeatedly exposing it to charges of
guilt by association.120 This dialectic between socialist and capitalist reform
is crucial to explaining the rise and fall of the twentieth century’s
constitution of opportunity, and will hopefully be incorporated in Fishkin
and Forbath’s final text.
At the dawn of the new century, proponents of the constitution of
opportunity abandoned the “old idea . . . that ownership of productive
property . . . was the material basis of middle-class-ness and of full

116. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 90).
117. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 72 (Houghton
Mifflin Co., 2003) (1958).
118. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 55).
119. See ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE 218–253, 371–408 (1991); EUGENE M.
TOBIN, ORGANIZE OR PERISH 148–150, 203–237 (1986); see also AZIZ RANA, THE RISE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 81–102 (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) (discussing the Socialist Party of
America’s radicalized discourse, in which the Constitution was depicted as a “trick[],” an
instrument of class rule).
120. See generally LANDON R.Y. STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF
THE NEW DEAL LEFT (2013).
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membership in the political community.”121 In its place, they embraced the
“new insight” that the “economic base” of full, free, and dignified
citizenship could be secured for wage labor by means of an intricate web of
legal regulation: “minimum wages and maximum hours laws,” “safety
standards,” “social insurance,” and, perhaps most importantly, collective
bargaining.122 This “new constitutional narrative of economic and social
development,” which held that the Constitution mandated the creation of a
unionized republic of wage laborers, experienced some initial success
during the Progressive Era but truly came into its own during the New Deal,
a regime that remains the cornerstone of liberal legal thought.123 And yet
the emphatically constitutional program to democratize American
capitalism—the intellectual infrastructure of the New Deal—has been
lost.124 Why?
One answer frequently given by American historians when asked to
explain the decline of the New Deal order is its refusal—or inability—to
extend the promise of economic egalitarianism to African-Americans and
women.125 Building on this historiographical tradition, Fishkin and Forbath
astutely analyze the extent to which the constitution of opportunity
excluded racial and sexual egalitarianism, both during the Progressive and
New Deal Eras.126 Fishkin and Forbath also allude to other externalist
explanations: the “postwar boom years” and “the rise of professional
economists” to positions of influence in government “muted” the sorts of
political disagreement that were once fought out on constitutional terrain.127
But “the most essential thread” in their explanation of the “Great
Forgetting” is strikingly legal and internalist.128 Because the New Dealers
secured their political-economic vision by convincing the Supreme Court in
1937 that this vision was not of constitutional concern, permitted but not
required by the Commerce Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, “the paradigmatic constitutional battleground” shifted from
“economic policy” to “civil liberties—and later, civil rights.”129 In an
“ironic result,” the “fight over New Deal economics” (a fight that was, in
truth, fueled by deep constitutional commitments) was “settled” by taking
political economy off the constitutional table.130

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 56) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (manuscript at 56–57) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (manuscript at 57–59).
Id. (manuscript at 65).
See generally KATZNELSON, supra note 25; ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF
EQUITY (2001); ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY (2012).
126. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 58, 60–61).
127. Id. (manuscript at 65).
128. Id. (manuscript at 65–66).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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The problem with this explanation is that political economy was not, in
fact, taken off the constitutional table during the late 1930s and 1940s. Or
rather, it only makes sense to say that it was if one adopts the sort of rigidly
formalistic and judge-centered understanding of constitutionalism that
Fishkin and Forbath otherwise reject.131 To the contrary, the “switch in
time” of 1937 was swiftly followed by a series of severe constitutional
challenges to the New Deal political-economic order.132 These challenges
were themselves fueled by domestic and international political-economic
crises, as the United States lapsed back into a bruising recession in mid1937, and Nazi aggression—culminating in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
with communist Russia and the invasion of Poland in 1939—threatened to
shutter all of Eurasia to free trade.133 Aided by economic failure at home
and the ascendance of fascism and communism abroad, conservatives in
Congress, the bar, and the press launched an all-out assault on the New
Deal administrative state, decrying it as the anticonstitutional beachhead of
domestic totalitarianism.134
This offensive was well-served by the coincidence of the 1937
recession with the Congress of Industrial Organizations’ unpopular strike
wave.135 The CIO’s campaign was seen by some as a cause of the downturn
and by many others as symptomatic of the New Deal’s irresponsible
encouragement of the most radical—even communist—elements of the
labor movement.136 As Professor Barry Karl writes: “Amid declining
industrial production and soaring unemployment, the call for more radical
action was replaced by concern for what the supposed radical action of the
New Deal had already done . . . .”137 That summer, Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan was defeated, not because it was no longer “necessary,” but
because moderate and conservative legal and media elites successfully

131. See id. (manuscript at 63) (distinguishing between court-centered and more popular
forms of constitutionalism that had been prominent features of American legal and political debate
prior to the mid-twentieth century).
132. See Jeremy K. Kessler, A War for Liberty: On the Law of Conscientious Objection, in 3
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 447, 459–60 (Michael Geyer & Adam
Tooze eds., 2015).
133. KATZNELSON, supra note 25, at 246–47; ADAM TOOZE, THE WAGES OF DESTRUCTION
318–21 (2006).
134. See LARRY CEPLAIR, ANTI-COMMUNISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53–64
(2011); JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW DEAL 211–324
(1967); RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT’S GOVERNMENT 55–78 (1966);
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 749–50
(2016) (reviewing ERNST, supra note 8).
135. See BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE 136–39 (1983).
136. See id. at 136–39, 154 (drawing the connection between public unease with the
perceived radicalism of organized labor and a growing distrust of the New Deal in light of the
1937 recession).
137. Id. at 154.
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painted it as an unconstitutional putsch against the rule of law.138 “An
alliance of southern Democrats and Republicans” rejected much of the rest
of the President’s second-term agenda the following fall, delivering
Roosevelt “perhaps[] the most significant defeat of his presidency.”139
Legislative resistance to the New Deal only stiffened when President
Roosevelt responded to his 1937 losses with a failed purge of Jim Crow
Democrats in the 1938 primaries—a last-ditch effort to extend the
constitution of opportunity to the South.140
Meanwhile, the American Bar Association (ABA) prepared a series of
broadsides against the “administrative absolutism” of the New Deal,
comparing its regulatory agenda to the illiberal regimes of Nazi Germany
and Stalinist Russia, and its constitutional defenders to Soviet legal
theorists.141 The focus of these attacks on New Deal administration was the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the institutional foundation of the
constitution of opportunity’s unionized republic of wage laborers. In the
1938 midterms, moderate Republican lawyers assailed the NLRB as
corrupted by “class feeling,” and argued that only less biased personnel and
more restrictive procedures could legitimate an agency tasked with
answering “fundamental questions of human right and even of human
liberty.”142
In 1940, Roosevelt himself purged the agency of its left-wing
members, battered by charges of communist infiltration.143 That same year,
the ABA’s proposal to subject New Deal agencies—the NLRB foremost
among them—to onerous new procedures and expansive judicial review
passed both houses of Congress.144 Facing an imminent war with Nazi
Germany, Roosevelt vetoed the bill on national security grounds.145 But the
needs of military mobilization led the President himself to embrace an
increasingly antitotalitarian constitutional discourse that contrasted an
Anglo-American tradition of limited government and individual rights with

138. See Kessler, supra note 132, at 458–61 (discussing this framing). Reflecting the mood
of the time, a constituent of Senator William Borah—himself a strong defender of judicial
independence—described Roosevelt’s plan as a “headlong rush into the CHASM where STALIN,
MUSSOLINI, and HITLER have led their countries.” PATTERSON, supra note 134, at 87. The
New York Herald Tribune agreed: “This is the beginning of pure personal government. Do you
want it? . . . Look around the world—there are plenty of examples—and make up your mind.” Id.
(quoting Dorothy Thompson, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 11, 1937, at 23).
139. KARL, supra note 135, at 168.
140. Id. at 160–61; KATZNELSON, supra note 25, at 175.
141. Special Committee on Admin. L., Am. B. Ass’n, Report of the Special Committee on
Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 343, 361 (1938).
142. ERNST, supra note 8, at 98–101.
143. STORRS, supra note 120, at 61–62.
144. See Kessler, supra note 134, at 754–56.
145. Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Administrative
Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 690 (2010).
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the statist legal regimes of the United States’ enemies, including, at the
time, Soviet Russia.146 In the wake of WWII, with Nazi Germany defeated
but Russian troops on the doorstep of Western Europe, President Truman
signed into law a watered-down version of the ABA’s prewar legislative
program—the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).147 Hailed at the time
in manifestly constitutional terms as a “bill of rights for the administrative
state,”148 the APA is recognized today as “super-statute” of constitutional
significance.149
Debates about the exact political-economic valence of the APA are
still ongoing.150 But there was and remains little doubt about the
significance of the next three quasi-constitutional attacks on the constitution
of opportunity. In the 1946 midterms, the Republican Party took control of
Congress for the first time in eighteen years.151 Running on a platform of
rabid anticommunism, the Republicans accused the Truman administration
of Soviet sympathy and anticapitalist subversion.152 In March 1947,
Truman covered his right flank by instituting a federal loyalty apparatus,
which continued the purge of left-wing administrators begun seven years
earlier at the NLRB.153 That same month, with Republican support, the
President funneled $400 million to anticommunist forces in Greece and
Turkey, and announced the “Truman Doctrine,” declaring that “it must be
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”154
Then in May, just as the Cold War was heating up, the Office of Price
Administration, a powerful wartime mechanism of property control, was
liquidated.155
Finally, in June, Republicans joined with Southern

146. See generally Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World War II and
the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW 185 (Daniel R. Ernst &
Victor Jew eds., 2002); John W. Wertheimer, A “Switch in Time” Beyond the Nine: Historical
Memory and the Constitutional Revolution of the 1930s, in 53 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY 3 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).
147. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1669–75 (1996). For continuities
between the APA and the earlier anti-New Deal administrative law reform bill, see id. at 1590–93;
and James E. Brazier, An Anti-New Dealer Legacy: The Administrative Procedure Act, 8 J. POL’Y
HIST. 206, 210–12 (1996).
148. JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE 60 (2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
149. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 393, 466 (2015).
150. See generally Kessler, supra note 132.
151. ROBERT J. DONOVAN, CONFLICT AND CRISIS 237 (1977).
152. Id. at 231–34.
153. STORRS, supra note 120, at 84.
154. JAN OZMAŃCZYK, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS 2378–79 (Anthony Manzo ed., 2003).
155. See MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS 225–31 (2005).
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Democrats to override Truman’s veto of the Taft–Hartley Act, a direct
assault on the NLRB and the industrial unions that had formed the base of
the New Deal coalition.156
A series of amendments to the New Deal’s crown jewel, the 1935
National Labor Relations Act, Taft–Hartley spelled the beginning of the end
of the unionized republic of wage labor.157 The law vindicated many of the
demands of the still-fledgling, but constitutionally portentous, “right to
work” movement, privileging individual “choice” over collective action in
the workplace and subjecting labor administration to greater judicial
control.158 It also required every union leader to file an affidavit swearing:
that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with
such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or
supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow
of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional methods.159
The enemies of the New Deal’s constitution of opportunity had
discovered a powerful new constitutional political economy in
anticommunism, which portrayed a great deal of federal microeconomic
regulation as anathema to constitutional democracy while entrenching new
forms of labor discipline as constitutional bulwarks against communist
lawlessness.160 This anticommunist constitutionalism had already stopped
the New Deal in its tracks in the late 1930s.161 While President Truman
tried to resist the harshest effects of anticommunism on New Deal labor
relations, his 1947 declaration of war against communism assured its
supremacy.162
Fishkin and Forbath pick up this thread in their last chapter, noting that
the defeat of unionization lies at the heart of our contemporary “Gilded
Age,”163 and tracing this defeat back to Taft–Hartley and subsequent “right
to work” legal victories of the 1950s and early 1960s.164 But they treat this

156. See GRISINGER, supra note 148, at 86–90; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT
HOME 238–41 (2d ed. 2003).
157. Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–97 (2012)).
158. See LEE, supra note 13, at 77 (quoting Cecil DeMille, who felt that despite his loss in the
courts “his position had been vindicated by Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act”); FISHKIN &
FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 82 n.230) (noting that Taft–Hartley loosened unions’
control over the in.dividual worker’s “right to work”).
159. Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, 1947 § 9(h), 61 Stat. at 146 (emphasis
added).
160. For the connection between New Deal critics and early Cold War political economy, see
CEPLAIR, supra note 134, at 75–78.
161. See supra notes 133–47 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
163. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 69).
164. Id. (manuscript at 82–83, 82 n.230).
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resurgence of “libertarian” constitutional political economy almost like a
natural fluid, filling the empty vessel that the “Great Forgetting” of
egalitarian constitutional political economy left behind.165 By putting Taft–
Hartley and its progeny back in the political-economic context of late New
Deal and early Cold War anticommunism, a different picture emerges: one
in which the constitution of opportunity was not forgotten but purged.166
Fishkin and Forbath’s trope of “forgetting” depends on their
description of the “postwar period” as an era in which “the parties . . . were
simply not all that far apart. Their divisions over economic matters did not
disappear, but with the anti-New Deal faction defeated, those divisions were
smaller.”167 But the anti-New Deal faction was not in fact defeated. The
constitutional political economy of anticommunism that this faction had
settled on in the late 1930s became the bipartisan lingua franca of the
postwar world. Anticommunism precluded—at times through criminal
sanctions168—widespread support for Fishkin and Forbath’s constitution of
opportunity and its call to “democratiz[e] the forms of ownership and
control that prevail over the means of work and social production.”169 The
comparatively small political-economic differences between Democrats and
Republicans in the 1950s and 1960s were an index of the extent to which
each party had recast itself as what Fishkin and Forbath elsewhere call a
“party of the Constitution” or a “party of Principle”170—committed not to
the maintenance of the New Deal order but to the re-articulation of a subset
of the New Deal’s political-economic ambitions within the parameters of
anticommunism.
To be sure, the constitutional political economy of anticommunism
was not simply antistatist or economically libertarian in the traditional
sense. The relatively egalitarian exercise of the federal government’s
taxing and spending authority and its expansion of civil rights were, in part,
constitutional responses to the challenge of a competing, communist
egalitarianism.171 But anticommunism also steadily corroded the legal and

165. Id. (manuscript at 64–67); cf. id. (manuscript at 73–76) (discussing the “libertarian
revival”).
166. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY 107 (1986) (“As the decade of
the 1940s drew to a close, the politics of anticommunism had exerted a chilling effect on virtually
all progressive causes.”).
167. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 65).
168. See generally ROBERT M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MCCARTHY-ERA
REPRESSION (2012); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES (1998); STORRS, supra note
120.
169. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 10 (manuscript at 90).
170. Id. (manuscript at 21–22, 39, 50).
171. See CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 29, at 113–14, 136–38; MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 12 (2000); AARON L. FRIEDBERG, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GARRISON STATE
81–97 (2000); James T. Fisher, “A World Made Safe for Diversity”: The Vietnam Lobby and the
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political infrastructure that would prove necessary to preserve economic
egalitarianism in the face of growing monetary and fiscal imbalances.
These imbalances reached a tipping point as early as 1968,172 exacerbated
by several features of anticommunist political economy: Cold War military
spending;173 fragmentary unionization under conditions of continual redbaiting (union density steadily declined after 1954);174 the proliferation of
capital-friendly tax expenditures;175 and the failure to impose more laborfriendly wage–price ratios.176 This last intervention would have given
workers a greater share of the returns to capital while loosening the bond
between middle-class prosperity and inflationary growth. But it was
anathema in an anticommunist republic.
Conclusion
Amid growing economic inequality, and growing awareness of that
problem in the legal academy,177 The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution has done
the vital work of bringing political economy back into constitutional
history, where it has long been absent. But that absence is itself explicable
by political-economic developments that Fishkin and Forbath’s narrative
does not yet fully capture. This Essay has argued that a fuller integration of
political-economic analysis and constitutional history will require more
attention to the political-economic conditions of constitutional discourse,
even where that discourse is itself “about” political economy. These
conditions include the anticonstitutional and anticapitalist social movements
that shaped the constitution of opportunity during the twentieth century.

Politics of Pluralism, 1945–1963, in COLD WAR CONSTRUCTIONS 217 (Christian G. Appy ed.,
2000).
172. See ROBERT SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, 1945–1981, at 114–
27 (updated ed. 1982); Robert M. Collins, The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the
“American Century”, 101 AM. HIST. REV. 396 (1996).
173. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, GUNS OR BUTTER 358–78 (1996); JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING
AMERICA 255–78 (1998); Collins, supra note 172, at 401.
174. See GERALD MAYER, CONG. RES. SERV., UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 12 (2004); see also JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS 250–52 (2003) (describing
antilabor smear campaigns of the mid-twentieth century); Nelson Lichtenstein, Pluralism, Postwar
Intellectuals, and the Demise of the Union Idea, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF
LIBERALISM 83, 83 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005) (tracing the decline of
unions and the political influence of organized labor in the post-WWII period).
175. See ZELIZER, supra note 173, at 86–98.
176. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION 98–140 (2002); MAEVA MARCUS,
TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE 58–82 (1977); Shane Mage, The “Neutrality” of the
Wage-Price Guidelines, in THE GREAT SOCIETY READER 159, 163–64 (Marvin E. Gettleman &
David Mermelstein eds., 1967).
177. See generally David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626
(2014) (reviewing PIKETTY, supra note 15); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of
Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file
with author); Symposium, Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014.
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The political economy of Cold War anticommunism, in turn, supplanted
both this anticapitalist tradition and its moderate double—the constitution
of opportunity. Accordingly, the construction of a more egalitarian political
economy will not simply be a matter of remembering a forgotten
constitutional language. The success of such a project will depend upon the
destruction of the material and discursive structures that silenced this
language in the first place.

